A Working Definition of Governance

GOVERNANCE:
- The process of decision-making
- The process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)

- UNESCAP 2009

Why Consider Governance in Disaster Recovery

1. Post-disaster recovery phase requires intense decision-making
2. Large influx of resources need to be coordinated, allocated, and tracked
3. Pre-existing governance structures are often overwhelmed by the demands of managing recovery
4. Urgency to show progress, particularly in adversely impacted areas

Key Issue 1: OWNERSHIP
- Option 1: Assert Country Ownership
- Option 2: Identify Role for Local Governments

Key Issue 2: PARTICIPATION
- Option 1: Manage Haste, Engaging Communities
- Option 2: Put Participation into Practice
- Option 3: Develop Participation Strategy

Key Issue 3: COMMUNICATION
- Option 1: Use Communication for Better Governance
- Option 2: Improve Access to Information for Better Coordination

Key Issue 4: CAPACITY
- Option 1: Plan Before a Disaster Happens
- Option 2: Increase Capacity through Partnership
- Option 3: Institutional Capacity to Manage Recovery
- Option 4: Capacity Building Programs

Key Issue 5: ACCOUNTABILITY
- Option 1: Clarify Roles and Responsibilities
- Option 2: Account for Actions Taken
Case 1: Inadequate Leadership, HONDURAS

**Background**
- 1998 Hurricane Mitch
- Massive damage: about USD4 Billion

**What is Problematic?** The government did not seem to own recovery efforts

**Process**
1. “All aid is welcome” policy adopted
2. No clear criteria to determine who was affected; Coherent nationwide strategies and programs could not be established
3. The public did not receive regular, clear, and unequivocal information on their entitlements to assistance and how to access support
4. Coordination was limited to bilateral donors
5. State was unprepared in terms of policy, systems, and resources for recovery

**Lessons**
- Compare with other experiences to draw lessons

Case 2: Recovery leadership, MOZAMBIQUE

**Background**
- 2000 & 2001 Floods

**What is Unique?** Systems put in place through build back better approach

**Process**
- National reconstruction and development policies linked with recovery
- Coordination systems put in place: appraising, monitoring, funding
- Partnership of stakeholders
- Local governments empowered

**Lessons**
- Build Back Better: systems
- Country ownership
- Partnership and collaboration
- Lack of leadership can lead to chaos

Case 3: Manifesting Ownership through BRR

**Background**
- Tsunami affected Aceh
- Local governments: poor planning, low-capacity
- Gaps: legislative framework and discharging functions

**What is Unique?** BRR established to coordinate recovery efforts

**Process**
- BAPPENAS formulated Master Plan
- BRR Headquarters in Aceh: coordination & implementation
- BRR developed the capacity of local governments

**Lessons**
- Physical presence of BRR in Aceh
- Progressive building of capacity
**Case 4: Gotong Royong in reconstruction, Yogyakarta**

**Background**
- 2006 Earthquake
- 127,000 completely destroyed; 450,000 damaged

**What is Unique?** Immediate start of housing reconstruction through “mutual help” and government capitalized on this tradition value

**Process**
- Elected village leader help identify beneficiaries
- Beneficiaries divided into groups (10-15 families)
- Group develops plans, and received fund through collective bank account
- Government established a Housing Reconstruction Task Force to assist groups

**Lessons**
- Designing recovery initiatives aligned with traditional value of mutual-help
- Community driven approach – help builds social capital

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**Case 6: Government supported community driven recovery, PAKISTAN**

**What is Unique?** Distribution of funds based on Community Livelihood Rehabilitation Plans

1. ERRA developed a community-driven livelihood recovery, with Community Investment Funds (CIFs) as key component
2. Distribution of fund is determined on the basis of Community Livelihoods Rehabilitation Plans (CLRP)
3. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) design and carry out CLRPs
4. Appropriate line agencies, local government, and NGOs provide support to CBOs
5. Livelihood Working Committees (LWCs) at every district and Livelihood Coordination Units (LCUs) are also established within national, state, and provincial levels (i.e. ERRA, SERRA, and PERRA)

**Lessons**
- Large-scale bottom-up approach can be more effective with significant top-down support
- Pitfalls are avoided by learning from prior experiences and adapting appropriate ideas
- Community-driven approaches require commitment and trust

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**Case 7: Partners facilitating participation**

- In Bangladesh, the government partnered with a local NGO called BRAC to facilitate community-led livelihood recovery. BRAC had established long standing relationships with local communities since the 1970’s through a wide range of services (including micro-finance, education, health and others).
- Following the Gujarat earthquake of 2001, the Government of India partnered with SEWA, the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) to implement a seven-year community-driven livelihood security project for rural households. SEWA, a trade union providing services to women working in the informal sector, was chosen because of its presence in the project area, its reputation for community capacity building and its widespread membership base in the form of women’s federations or self help groups
- In the capital city of Nicaragua, an initiative to upgrade and protect public infrastructure from flood damage, collaborated with the Sandinista Defense Committees - neighborhood groups formed during the Nicaragua Revolution. Because of their structure, motivation, and the cohesion of their members, they proved an extremely effective instrument for reaching and involving the local population.
- After a series of typhoons hit the Philippines, the department of education developed a program to rebuild schools to disaster resistant standards wherein principal or school heads, along with Parent Teacher & Community Associations, took charge of the implementation and management of the reconstruction.
Case 9: Impacts of one-way communication on project

Mozambique

- The subsequent floods of 2001 affected an additional 500,000 people, of which 223,000 were displaced. In total, over 40,000 families were resettled to less flood-prone areas. Due to a lack of consultation, and a resulting sense of helplessness and dependency, the resettlement created significant hardship for individuals now forced to reinvent new livelihoods or migrate long distances to their farmlands or to distant cities for work. This also disrupted social and family dynamics, particularly when men were forced to leave their families throughout the week to earn a living. Many families simply refused to leave their lands, and rebuilt their homes within the floodplains.

The Maldives

- There was an unprecedented investment by aid agencies in infrastructure (non-existent prior to the tsunami). However, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition found that in most cases, these facilities were lying abandoned and unused – the fish markets were intended to be run by fisheries cooperatives in a context where cooperatives have historically not existed, while the construction of the waste management facilities was not accompanied by any awareness-raising campaigns on hygiene and civic responsibility, or the potential economic benefits of waste recycling.

Case 10: Frustrations of inadequate information sharing

Solomon Islands

- “Awareness about international aid should be shared equally among the rural populace. For example, we hear about funds for a cattle project only after all the funds have been used.” Education officer, Auki, Malaita

- “NGOs and government made too many promises which did not eventuate. A lot of interviews were done in communities, but nothing forthcoming. We were given high hopes that assistance will be coming. Days, months, years passed by, still no green light. No moa trust lo oiketa nao [We don’t trust them anymore now].” Women leader in Visale, West Guadalcanal

Aceh, Indonesia

- A large number of people expressed their dismay that they did not have enough information about aid and aid processes. “I do not want to blame anyone; I just want information,” said one man as he commented on problems with aid distributions. Another said, “If people are getting different aid, they need to know why.” Others said: “If we understand, then we can be patient.”

- “They gave our village ten boats. But why ten boats? It just seemed arbitrary.” “I do not know the system of aid, and cannot read and write, so I cannot get help.” “The process of receiving aid is not clear to the beneficiaries.”

- Because people do not feel informed, they often cited rumors that they had heard. “We heard this, but we are not sure.”

Case 11: Information management in Tamil Nadu

What is Unique? Establishment of resource center for coordination and management.

1. Two NGOs initiated the “NGO Coordination and Resource Centre” (NCRC) after Tsunami
2. Tamil Nadu State Government partnered with NCRC
3. NCRC organizational structure: front office, village information center, and sectoral teams

Lessons

- Social audits of recovery activities could be effectively done by a separate, non-implementing organization like NCRC
- Village level information centers help sustain presence to affected communities
- NCRC, now BEDROC, presence helps communities become more resilient to the effects of climate change and other natural hazards
- NCRC’s transition to BEDROC ensured that valuable lessons learned during recovery phase are not lost
**Case 12: Communicating strategy of seismic resistant housing initiative in Pakistan**

**What is Unique?** Communication strategy to meet information needs

1. ERRA developed a communication strategy, which identified the audience, the type of information, and the purpose of communication.
2. For each stakeholder group, both the content and medium of communication had to be contextually appropriate: artisans, engineers, public, donors.
3. Feedback from initial activities led to further updates to the strategy, and several key changes were made.
4. New communication challenges arose as engineers balked at using a technique with little scientific backing to confirm the seismic resistant properties.

**Lessons**

- Building back better typically requires a change of behavior and practice based on new knowledge. When such information, especially of a technical nature, is not communicated in a familiar and meaningful way to intended recipients, the desired changes are unachievable.
- A good communication strategy is flexible with feedback mechanisms to identify changing conditions and corresponding communication needs of stakeholders.
- The case illustrates the necessity for two-way communication to account for critical social and economic factors as well as other potential hazards facing a population. Identifying and negotiating such factors, helps to develop more sustainable and risk-reducing solutions.

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**Case 14: RAN System, INDONESIA**

**What is Unique?** Coordinating all reconstruction projects through online systems database

1. Recovery of Aceh and Nias (RAN) Database, a relatively low-tech, robust ICT system was designed.
2. Data entry was initiated through a project concept note (PCN), which each implementing partner was obligated to submit for approval before initiating a recovery project.
3. The RAN Database system automatically captured all data as supplied by PCNs.

**Lessons**

- For this type of information-sharing mechanism to be effective, implementing agencies must enter the necessary data in a timely manner.
- Consideration should be given to the information technology infrastructure required to support online tools such as this. There have been many cases, including Aceh, in which local and district governments were unable to access the database due to poor or non-existent internet connectivity.

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**Case 15: 2000 flood lessons improved 2001 flood management**

**What is Unique?** Coordination systems put in place during recovery

1. The government of Mozambique made three successive appeals in 2000 for response to floods.
2. In 2001, the government declared a flood emergency and appealed to the international community for US$30 million in emergency assistance. By mid-May 2001, 93 percent of the appeal had been met.
3. Agencies were better prepared to respond to the 2001 floods because the systems and contacts established in 2000 were in place.
4. The government, the UN system, and the major agencies, such as the Mozambique Red Cross, had all undertaken lessons learning exercises and developed contingency plans, which resulted in significant improvements in responses.

**Lesson** seizing opportunity during recovery phase to improve capacity.
**Case 16: Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning, Los Angeles**

**Background**
- Lessons from previous earthquakes (e.g. Loma Prieta)
- PEPPER: study as theoretical foundation for planning
- Scenarios

**What is Unique?** Recovery plan puts in place even before a disaster happens

**Process**
- Research studies; lessons from previous earthquakes
- Policies & Procedures: protocols, guidelines
- Coordination mechanisms: recovery support functions
- Funding: pre-arranged agreements for supplies & resources

**Lessons**
- Pre-planning is advantageous, especially for recurring disasters
- Maintaining continuity & improvement over time

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**Case 17: University’s role in recovery, YOGYAKARTA**

**Background**
- 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake
- Issues: technical knowledge and resources

**What is Unique?** University provided technical assistance in community-driven reconstruction initiative

**Process**
- University facilitated a system to ensure quality: technical support & training
- POSYANIS: a department unit extending full support (faculty, staff, & students)
- Developed simple “technical guidelines"
- Mobile housing clinics
- Coordination and Accreditation at District Public Works

**Lessons**
- UGM learned lessons from Aceh experience
- Scenario setting & galvanize real champions

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**Case 19: Local government capacity building initiative, Peru**

**Background**
- 2007 earthquake
- No considerations of local government roles (side-tracked)

**What is Unique?** Provision of full time UNDP staff at local government for 2 years

**Process**
- UNDP deployed full time staff for 2 years
- Function of coordination centers transferred to local governments
- Local governments developed recovery plans with TA from UNDP

**Lessons**
- Local government capacity & leadership enhanced
- Local government identify local priorities
- Recovery planning as part of development planning

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**V ACCOUNTABILITY**
**Case 20: Unclear roles impede recovery, Maldives**

**Background**
- 2004 Tsunami
- Highly centralized management
- Role of traditional Island Chiefs neglected

**What is Problematic?** Functional roles of island chiefs not clearly defined

**Process**
- New National Recovery Committee fail to clarify roles of island chiefs
- Traditional roles: planning, implementation, management
- While island chiefs named focal point, there is no guidelines of their recovery functions

**Lessons**
- Lack of formal planning role resulting to confusion
- Coordination: not well-facilitated
- Difficulty in identifying accountability

**Case 22: Financial tracking system, Haiti**

**Background**
- 2010 Earthquake
- USD9 Billion pledges

**What is Unique?** Introduction of financial tracking system called “The Haitian Platform for Public Investment”

**Process**
- Database online: track pledge, hold donors to pledge, transparency, and accountability
- Tapped experienced developers of financial tracking system

**Lessons**
- Learning’s from past experiences modified systems to fit context
- Analysis linked to PDNA (knowledge on financial gaps)
- Crucial for decision makers and ensure accountability

**THANK YOU!**